Service-oriented architecture (SOA) has been widely adopted in the development of many net-centric application systems. In SOA, services potentially from different domains are composed together to accomplish critical tasks. In these systems, security and trustworthiness are the major concerns that have not been well addressed. Many access control models have been developed to ensure proper accesses to critical resources from local as well as external domains. Also, many data provenance schemes have been proposed in recent years to support data quality assessment and enhancement, data reproduction, etc. However, none of the existing mechanisms consider both access control and data provenance in a unified model. In this paper, we propose an integrated role-based access control and data provenance model to secure the cross-domain interactions. We develop a role-based data provenance scheme which tracks the roles of the data originators and contributors and uses this information to help evaluate data trustworthiness. We also make use of the data provenance information and the derived data quality attributes to assist with role-based access control. In this integrated model, the secure usage of a data resource must also consider the quality and trustworthiness of the data. To realize this concept, we develop an extended access control model in which access permissions are specified with constraints over the provenance attributes. Also, to assure confidentiality, we record the access constraints from the data originators and contributors to help decide how the data should be further disseminated.
Introduction
Many modern applications are net-centric, involving a continuously-evolving community of people, information, hardware, and services networked together to facilitate sharing and accomplishing global-scale tasks. Example netcentric applications include supply chain, large-scale emergency response, and command and control systems. In recent years, service-oriented architecture (SOA) and related technologies have been applied to the development and deployment of these net-centric application systems to reduce the development cost and time. In SOA based netcentric systems, services offered by software, hardware, and human may be composed together into a workflow to achieve the desired tasks. Most of these application systems involve services provided by multiple administrative domains. Trustworthiness and security are the major issues in this environment. During the execution of a workflow, shared information flows through services across multiple administrative domains. A data generated by one service in the system may not be sufficiently trustable to be used in a critical decision making by another service. Authorizing an undesirable access to critical information can result in severe security breach. Thus, proper access control modeling and security assurance techniques are critical in policing the accesses within a domain and cross domains. Also, data provenance models and techniques are critical for tracking the origin and processing of data in order to determine their quality and trustworthiness.
There have been significant advances in access control and data provenance models and techniques. Access control refers to the technique that enables an organization to control the accesses (of any internal/external person or process) to the resources of the organization. The basic concept of access control is the definition of an abstract access control matrix [1] where, each row refers to a user, each column refers to a protected resource in the system, and each entry of the matrix encodes the granted operations (e.g. read/write/execute in operating system, insert/update/delete in database, etc.). In the past three decades, many access control models have been developed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . Among all these models, role-based access control (RBAC) models [1] [3] are most widely used in enterprises and other organizations. Role-based model can greatly cut down the cost of the policy specification. In rolebased system, the security officer only needs to specify m·k mappings (between m users and k roles) and k·n mappings (between k roles and n permissions). In access control systems in which the access control policies are directly defined over the users and permissions, the security officer has to specify m·n mappings. As in most systems, the number of roles, k, is much smaller than the number of users, m, the specification of role-based access control policies is much easier. Moreover, role-based model provides a natural representation (role hierarchy) of the structure of the users in an organization. Role faithfully describes the responsibility and authority of the user in the position represented by the role. Attribute-based access control (ABAC) [8] [9] is another access control scheme that is widely discussed in recent years. Attribute-based models are very suitable for the open systems where requesters (users and processes) are rarely pre-known to the access module. Attribute-based access control can be regarded as a natural extension of many conventional access control models (e.g. multi-level security model, role-based model, etc.), and is highly expressive. However, the cost of policy specification and decision making in ABAC greatly depends on the set of attributes selected for the involved domains (e.g. its size). Moreover, there are lack of a well formed standard for attribute-based models, and, thus, are hard to be put to use in practice.
Most conventional access control models are developed on the basis of a closed system where the users/processes and the protected resources are well defined. When applying these access control models to the multi-domain system, where accesses are frequently across the domain boundaries and, hence, there arises a cross-domain interoperability issue. That is, when evaluating an access posed by a user from another domain, it is necessary to map him/her to some internal user and then perform policy evaluation. There are generally two approaches to secure cross-domain interoperation. The first approach is to have a trusted mediator to integrate the hierarchies of the two interacting domains (i.e. role hierarchy in role-based model, the lattice in multi-level security system, and domain ontology in attribute-based access control) [10] [11] . In role-based access control or multi-level security model, the global hierarchy generated from this process may frequently conflict with the access control requirements of the individual domains. That is, a subordinate user in the hierarchy may acquire the permission of a superior user through a chain of inter-domain mappings of roles or security classes. Hence, many of the works in the literature focus on the conflict resolution and the optimization of this process. Even though various conflicts can be resolved to achieve a consistent global hierarchy, the mediator-based approach also suffers from the scalability and fairness issue (inter-domain mappings of some domains are removed but the mappings of others remain). It also requires a fully trusted mediator to perform the integration. In [11] [13], mediator-free solutions are proposed to secure cross-domain interoperation. They do not perform the integration of the hierarchies. They record all the interdomain mappings that are activated to enable the access, and deny the access when there is a cycle.
Data provenance is to track the detailed derivation process of each critical data object. There are three main components in a data provenance mechanism: the capture mechanism, the representational model, and the infrastructure for storage, access, and queries [13] . Existing capture mechanisms can be categorized into four classes: query based, work flow based, process based, and operating system base. Workflow base data provenance approaches have been widely adopted in e-science and SOA based system [14] [15] [16] because a workflow is generally a close abstraction of the sequence of operations to be performed to achieve a task. Process based mechanisms instrument the programs to capture provenance. OS based mechanisms capture the sequence of system calls. The process based and OS based mechanisms are mostly ad hoc, and require post-reprocessing to extract the actual processing steps from the low level information to the high level steps in the task.
Though the workflow model is suitable for capturing the processing steps in many applications, it does not provide a good abstraction for a database system and its data accesses. In database systems, provenance information is obtained by analyzing the history of queries. Various approaches have been proposed to obtain various information that lead to the query results, including the why-, how-, and whereprovenance [17] [18] . Why-provenance captures all the data objects that have contributed to the creation of a resulting data object. How-provenance, in addition, captures the specific process for deriving a result data object. Whereprovenance, on the other hand, determines the locations in the database from which the output data is copied. Each type of provenance information has some applications.
Some works specifically focus on provenance for SOA based systems. Most of them use the existing provenance model, but consider designs of the provenance infrastructure that are suitable for SOA. In [19] , a process based model is used to capture the provenance information where the services are instrument at the data consumption and production time. The provenance infrastructure provides the provenance collection service (PCS) and provenance query service (PQS). In [16] , a comprehensive framework for data provenance in SOA based systems has been presented. It uses workflow based provenance technique for provenance information capturing. Also, a set of services are designed to perform the provenance tasks, including data classification, collection, and analysis tasks. One contribution of the work is the agile data classification to facilitate selection of data to be tracked. It also proposes several models to derive various attributes of data quality.
In existing research, data provenance and access control have been modeled independently. In fact, the rich information in data provenance can be used in making access control decisions, not only for integrity but also for confidentiality considerations. For example, the ownership information can help determine when, where, and how the data can be further disseminated for confidentiality protection. On the other hand, the formal and well established access control models can be used to help with data provenance.
In this paper, we propose an integrated access control and data provenance model. We address several important issues in this integrated model. First, we develop a role-based data provenance model to track richer information about the data originators and contributors so as to achieve the secure usage of the data resources dynamically generated in a multidomain environment. We use a directed acyclic graph (DAG) to represent the provenance information and include it within the metadata associated with the data. In this graph, each node includes not only the data originator/contributor and its quality measurement, e.g. data reliability, trustworthiness, etc., but also the role that the originator or contributor activates during the interaction and the domain information.
Second, we develop a model for data quality representation and derivation. We consider three data quality attributes, data reliability, data trustworthiness, and trustworthiness reinforcement factor. We leverage existing data quality derivation techniques and introduce new concepts for the derivation of these attributes. The role based model is used for the evaluation of data trustworthiness. Also, the semantic model, RDF, is applied to identify repetitive information generated by distinct paths, which is then used to compute the reinforcement factor toward data trustworthiness. Third, we extend the conventional role-based access control model to control the data dissemination and usage in multi-domain environment by considering the provenance and data quality information. Specifically, when using a data generated with multiple data originators and contributors to perform certain actions, e.g. writing to a local data storage, sending a command to a printer, we evaluate the quality of the data to help decide whether the usage of the data or the action to be performed is secure. We specify constraints over a set of quality attributes, e.g. data quality, reliability, trustworthiness, user/service and domain information, etc. Such constraints are evaluated together with the access control policies when a service receives some potentially corrupted information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the general system model. In Section 3, we discuss the role-based integrated model, including basic rolebased access control and cross-domain role mapping. We also propose a role-based data provenance model in this section. Section 4 discusses the data quality attributes and the methods for evaluating them. In Section 5, we discuss our integrated role-based access control and provenance model. This paper is concluded in Section 6.
System Model
We consider the access control and data provenance issues in a general multi-domain environment. In such an environment, an application may involve many users and/or processes from different administrative domains. These users and/or processes may access resources (data resources or processes) in other domains. It is very unlikely to have a centralized authority to manage the provenance data or perform access control for these distributed resources. A distributed protocol for access control and provenance data management is necessary.
We consider that each domain ( Figure 1) is any protected entity that may contain data. The physical resources in a domain may include data containers, e.g. files, directories, columns, rows, tables, views, the input and output channels of services, etc., and exhaustible system resources, e.g. disk space, printers, bandwidth, etc. A data resource d i .dr j includes the data itself and the associated metadata, e.g. the history of the data generation and process, the measurement of data quality, reliability, trustworthiness, etc. A data resource must be either contained in a physical resource or must be processed by a service. The security authority d i .sa is the entity that includes all the processes for access control and provenance data management. Note that, for convenience, we use dom(s) to represent the domain of service s.
Figure 1. General system model.
We consider a general dataflow model ( Figure 2 ) to model the interactions between services. A service composition includes the end user that generates the initial input, a set of services that perform the processing, and the ender user that receives the final output. Note that, the end users can be treated in exactly the same way as any of the services and the two end users in a service composition may be the same or different individuals. Also, these users and services may be in the same domain or in different domains. Each service d i .s j takes in the input data from the user or other services, completes its computation, and then generates its output which is delivered to other services or the user. During this computation, each service d i .s j may read/write some data resources from/to some physical resources in d i . 
Role Based Model
In this paper, we consider a role-based model to represent access control and data provenance information. Security authority controls both the accesses to physical resources and the accesses to
Role-based Access Control
Role-based access control (RBAC) [2] [3] is the access control scheme most frequently used by commercial organizations. The basic idea of RBAC is to define roles based on the job functions within an organization and assign users and permissions (a permission is an approval of performing a certain operation over a set of physical resources) to roles. During an access, the user acquires permissions by activating corresponding roles. Besides the components in this core RBAC model, many RBAC implementations include two additional features, i.e. role hierarchy and constraints. A role hierarchy defines the "inheritance" relationship among roles. That is, role r 1 inherits role r 2 if all the permissions of r 2 are also the permissions of r 1 . The role hierarchy provides a natural way to represent the role structure in an organization and allows convenient composition of a role from multiple subordinate roles (multiple inheritances). Constraints can be defined to restrict the user-to-role assignment, permission-to-role assignment, and role activation. The examples include the separation-of-duty (mutually exclusive roles) constraint, cardinality constraint, prerequisite roles, temporal constraint, etc.
In this paper, we consider a role-based access control model for web service environment. The permissions are not only defined for physical resources but also for web services. We consider a web service as a special type of physical resource and treat it accordingly. The operations that can be performed over a web service include "send_to" (can invoke the service by sending some input data to the service) and "receive_from" (can receive the output data of the service). Consider an example in which the end user x sends an input data to service y, and y reads from some of its local physical resources pr 1 , writes to some physical resource pr 2 , and delivers its output to the user z. In this case, user x needs to have the write permissions for both service y and service pr 1 . Also, user z needs to be eligible to read from service y and pr 2 .
Inter-Domain RBAC
In a multi-domain environment, it is necessary to consider the inter-domain access control issues. In order to secure the critical physical resources of domain A from the access posed by a user in domain B, it is necessary to map the user (having role r B ) to a role in domain A, say r A . This is achieved by creating a role mapping from r B to r A . A straightforward solution is to compose the role hierarchies of the two domains, i.e. H A and H B , into a global role hierarchy H, by introducing inter-domain role mappings. However, these inter-domain role mappings may introduce a cycle in the global hierarchy H, enabling a subordinate user in domain A to pursue the permissions of a superior role in domain A, which conflicts with the security constraints of domain A. To remove such a conflict, it is necessary to remove one of the inter-domain role mappings that result in the conflict. Hence, major efforts have been devoted to the resolution of such conflicts. Shafiq, et al. [10] consider an optimization problem in the conflict resolution, i.e., given a set of role hierarchies, H 1 , …, H n , and a set of inter-domain role mappings M, select a subset of M, M', such that the composed global role hierarchy H contains no cycles and the total number of allowed inter-domain accesses is maximized. They cast the problem into an integer programming (IP) problem by encoding the role hierarchies and role mappings into IP constraint inequalities and solving it accordingly.
The mechanism in [10] requires a centralized mediator which has the global view of the system to generate the global hierarchy. It also suffers from a fairness problem, i.e. it restricts the accesses of users in some domains but does not affect the users in other domains. To address these issues, Shehab, et al. [12] have considered a mediator-free solution. The basic idea is that they do not perform any role hierarchy composition but record the path that a user pursues the roles. If the path information may result in a cycle, then the access will be denied. Note that the roles can be pursued in two ways. First, a user with a superior role can directly enter its immediate subordinate role. Second, a user with role r A in domain A can enter role r B in domain B, if there is an interdomain role mapping from r A to r B .
In this paper, we consider a mediator-free role mapping mechanism similar to the mechanism in [10] . Consider a service chain <x, y, z>, where x reads some physical resource in dom(x), dom(x).pr i , and y reads some physical resource in dom(y), dom(y).pr j . In order to grant y's access to dom(x).pr i , it is necessary to find a cross-domain role mapping that maps y's role into some role in domain dom(x) that includes the permission required by dom(x).pr i . To grant z's accesses to dom(x).pr i and dom(y).pr j , it is necessary to find a set of consistent cross-domain role mappings (that will not result in a cycle) that map z to some role in dom(x), to enable z's access to dom(x).pr i , and to some role in dom(y), to enable z's access to dom(y).pr j .
Role-based Data Provenance
We consider that the provenance information of each data resource is transmitted among services together with the data. We consider both detailed and summarized provenance information specification. In the detailed provenance data specification, the provenance information is represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG). In this graph, each node is a tuple (u, R, d, Q) where, u is the user/service (data generator or processor) name presented in the interaction, R is the set of roles activated by u in the interaction, d is the domain of u, and Q is the quality measurement (e.g. data quality, reliability, trustworthiness, etc.) of the data. Figure 3 shows the DAG-based specification of the provenance information of the output (i.e., a gene) of a promoter identification workflow. Transmitting the DAG-based provenance information may incur a high communication cost, especially in a long chain of services. In case that the detailed provenance information prior to some user/service x (i.e. the names, roles, domains of the users/services prior to x) may not be required for decision making, x can temporarily store the DAG of its output data and only send out the summarized provenance information to the next entity in the composition. The summarized provenance information refers to the quality measurement of the data (i.e. quality, reliability, trustworthiness, etc.). In case that some subsequent service of x, say y, needs the detailed provenance information prior to x for decision making, y can send a query to x requesting x's DAG. Figure 4 shows a DAG containing the summarized provenance information of the service "GenBank Sequence Retrieval". 
Data Quality Analysis
In many applications, information is used in critical decision making processes and the quality of the data used in the process has a high impact on the soundness of the decision. Frequently, the decision may have high consequences and the data quality should be clearly understood to aid the decision making process to assess the trustworthiness and confidence of the decision.
The complexity of accurately assessing data quality can be high in net-centric applications because data used by an application may come from multiple sources distributed over different administrative domains. These data are being further processed by services in different domains. The appropriate way to achieve reasonable quality assessment is through data provenance, where the creation and subsequent computations on the data can be captured and the quality can be assessed accordingly.
Some major attributes regarding data quality include data reliability, trustworthiness, timeliness, privacy, precision, and confidentiality. Assessments of some of the data quality attributes have been investigated in the literature. In [20] , the model for assessing the trustworthiness of the data based on provenance information has been proposed. The data reliability analysis methodology proposed in [16] builds a solid foundation for data reliability assessment. A survey of data quality research is given in [21] , where various aspects of data quality have been introduced and some of the methods to compute them have been briefly discussed. We leverage existing works and propose a new model for improved data quality assessment. The differences in our data quality assessment approach include:
(1) Some data quality attributes that are frequently considered in an aggregate view in existing works are treated independently in our model. There are two major reasons for making this change. First, it is difficult to express many data quality attributes in one formula. Having one data quality assessment value can also eliminate some useful information that resides in individual attributes. Thus, we consider using multi-dimensional representation for the data quality model and support fine grained policy definitions based on these individualized attributes. For example, we separate data reliability and the contributors' trustworthiness models, allowing a cleaner and more justified definition of data quality. Also, we consider the reinforcement or contradictory effects of multiple versions of a data object as a separate data quality attribute, allowing the user of the data to decide how to make use of the specific information.
(2) We incorporate the authorities and responsibilities of the roles of the data contributors into the data trustworthiness assessment model to capture their impacts.
(3) A semantic based model is used for making a better decision on whether multiple data objects are in fact multiple versions of the same data object. According to the decision, the reinforcement or inconsistency effects of the data with other information in the system can be assessed.
As discussed in (1), we express data quality Q for a data object d as a tuple:
. , . , . where .
is the reliability of the data. . is the trustability of the data based on the trustworthiness of the entities that have contributed to the computation of d. . is the reinforcement factor of the data. When the same information is produced by different entities in the system, then the information is reinforced and becomes more trustworthy. On the other hand, if different entities provide inconsistent information (for example, conflicting information for the same scenario), then the trustworthiness of the information may be substantially reduced. Note that in 
Data Reliability
The derivation of data reliability should be modeled based on the generation and computation of the data. First, data is originated by a service that only generates output object(s) without any input. Such generation process can be sensor readings (such as camera, radar, temperature sensors, etc.), human observations (such as the reported number of injured people in a rescue mission, medical records generated by a doctor, etc.), or scientific experimental results. In these cases, the data reliability depends on the reliability of the service providers, such as the sensor or the human or the physical equipment used in the experiments, as well as the operational environment. For example, the accuracy of the sensor impacts the reliability of the data output by the sensor. Also, the condition of the operational environment can have a significant impact on the sensor reading accuracy. In the case of a clear day, radar or camera sensor readings can be accurate. On a day with thunderstorms or sandstorms, visual sensors may not be able to produce good quality data. In an environment with heavy radiations, the radar signal may get severe noises and the output data may be less accurate. We consider a simple model where the service provider assigns the data reliability to each data object it generates based on its operational environment and other potential factors. Thus, data quality generated by an originator service S 0 can be defined as . . , where is the data generated by service S 0 , . is the reliability of service S 0 , and , is the reliability of in S 0 's perspective (the reliability of assigned by S 0 ).
In the computation process, new data objects may be generated based on some existing data objects. In general, the computation process can be characterized by a workflow of services. Consider service S i taking a set of input objects , , , , … , , and generating a set of output data objects , , ,
, . The reliability of the output data depends on the reliability of the input data and the reliability of the service. We follow a similar analysis process given in [16] and define the data reliability based on computation as follows:
, .
. , .
, ,
where , , 1 if , is used in computing , in S i and , , 1/ , . otherwise. Note that the input data objects in could be the input parameters of S i as well as those data objects read from the local database of S i . A data object in the local database can be the stored results of a series of computations based on data objects originated by other entities. Local database or local input data may also be data objects generated by the service. In the latter case, the reliability of the input data should be evaluated in the same way as in the data origination case. Assuming that , is generated by S i locally, then we have , .
. , ,
Similarly, the output data objects in could be the output parameter of S i as well as those data objects stored in the database of S i .
Role-Based Trustworthiness
We separate the assessments of data trustworthiness and data reliability. Data trustworthiness is mainly concerned with the trustworthiness of its originators and subsequent contributors. A data object generated by a highly trusted entity is highly trusted but it may or may not be reliable. The generator and contributors can alter the assessment of the reliability of the data using their judgment based on the operational environment and other potential factors. The trustworthiness of the entities that manipulated the data not only impacts the trustworthiness of the data, but also the trustworthiness of the associated metadata, such as data reliability and other provenance information.
In existing data quality assessment works, the roles of the originators and the contributors have not been specifically taken into account. In fact, the role of the data generator or contributor can have important impact on data quality. Generally, if the data objects generated or processed by an entity who has the authority for the specific class of the data objects, then the data objects can be more reliable. For example, in an emergency situation, after rescuing some injured people, the medical personnel has a higher authority in judging the conditions of the injured people than the policemen who may have rescued these injured people. Thus, the information for assessing the conditions of the injured people will have a higher quality if it is generated by the entities with the role of medical personnel. Similarly, during a rescue mission, the information about the number of trapped people in a region coming from a policeman may be more trustworthy than information coming from a regular citizen because the policeman has the authority and, hence, needs to be more certain about the information before spreading it. Thus, it is necessary to consider the role and the authority of the role toward the data when considering the quality of the data.
To incorporate the concept discussed above, we build a role-based trustworthiness assessment model. First, we assume that each entity E i in the system has a trust score. There have been a large number of trust assessment works and we leverage the existing methodologies in our analysis model. Also, as with all role-based systems, we consider an entity as having one or more roles and based on each role, it can offer various services. Note that here we consider the services the role can offer as a provider, not those that the role can invoke as a customer. Let E i denote the entity that provides the service S i and .
denote the trust score of E i . Also, let . denote the role of E i when the service S i is provided. In addition, let .
denote the set of all services provided by E i . Now we consider the authority or responsibility of a role r in providing a service s. As discussed earlier, a policeman may report the number of people trapped in an accident and a general citizen may provide the same service. But in case the provider role r is not an authority or responsive personnel for the provided service s, then the trust value for the service may be lower. We define , as the authority or responsiveness of role r toward a service s an entity e with role r provides, where . . The trustworthiness of an output , generated from a service S i by a provider E i can be defined as:
, . . . , .
Here, , . is the local trust value solely based on the operation performed by S i . In the case when , is generated based on some operations on the set of input data objects of S i , In i , then the trustworthiness of the data is the minimal value among the originators' and contributors' trustworthiness scores. This is because the weakest link in the workflow for generating the data has the most significant impact on the trustworthiness of the data. Accordingly, we have:
, . min min , . , , .
. As in the case of the data reliability assessment, if , is used for computing , in S i , then , . is used as is; otherwise, , .
should be set to 1. Also, if , is not an input parameter of S i but a data object read from the local database of S i , then the trust value of , has to be further investigated. If
, is the stored result of a series of computations based on data objects originated by other entities, the , . is stored with , and can be retrieved and used directly. If , is generated by S i locally during the computation, then , . . . , .
Data Consistency and Impact on Trustworthiness
In net-centric applications, there may be a large number of entities in the system. Some sequences of actions may be taken by more than one set of entities intentionally or advertently and potentially creating similar results. If several data objects are generated differently, but end up describing the same information in a consistent way, then they reinforce each other and the overall trustworthiness of the information is enhanced. In case the information from different entities is inconsistent and contradict with each other, then the trustworthiness of the information reduces.
In [20] , the issue of data similarity is analyzed. Data clustering technique is used to identify similar data based on their distances. Whether similar data objects reinforce each other or contradict each other is determined based on a set of rules. Users can specify rules of conflicting data objects and identify them accordingly. In [21] , data consistency is defined based on data semantics. For example, if one piece of information states that "the salaries of the employees in a company x are all above $100,000" and some other data objects indicate that "Alice is an employee of company x" and "Alice's salary is $70,000", then the information is inconsistent. However, such data similarity and conflicts and consistency of information can be difficult to determine in net-centric systems, due to the dynamics of information and the potentially very large amount of information. Also, the representation of the information impacts the effectiveness of the techniques.
We consider the semantic web based approach for information representation. In the Resource Description Framework (RDF), the information is expressed by three entities, the resource, the property, and the value. We assume that data objects are expressed in RDF form. The information in the database can be converted into RDF form based on database schemas. The data flow through the workflow can be expressed in RDF form by having the data types of the input and output parameters of the services being defined in RDF. Given the RDF representation, inconsistent information can be reasoned and identified using the inference engine.
For identification of information describing the same "thing", we consider a confined view, focusing on those that can impact the trustworthiness of the data. Instead of considering consistent data, which is mostly the case and does not have a clear impact on information trustworthiness, we consider "repetitive" information. First, we identify pieces of information expressed in RDF and identify those with similar "properties", either by exact match or by similarity based match. For RDF data with the same properties, if their "resources" matches, then their "values" should also match. Once such matching data are identified, their provenance information is examined to determine their "path similarity" (as defined in [20] ). If the paths of the information generation process are sufficiently different, then the repetitive data are reinforcing information to each other.
Also, we consider the workflow model in data consistency assessment and focus on the impact on data quality. In the workflow model, information flow through the services and some get stored in the databases of the services. We only consider the consistency of information within each service and relevant to the current processing.
When repetitive data or inconsistent data are identified, we define the reinforcement factor accordingly. is the workflow path that through which the data object d is generated, where .
, , … , if d is generated by based recursively on the output from to . Also, . , . is the path similarity between the generation paths for data objects x and d. We follow the path similarity definition given in [20] , where similarity between two paths and is defined as counts the number of repetitive information and the number of inconsistent information and uses their difference as the reinforcement factor. However, for each piece of repetitive information, the similarity of its generation paths to the generation path of d is considered instead of the count of 1.
. is useful for determining the trustworthiness of the data. It can be used to adjust .
value. However, we retain the information of . to allow it to be used for other assessments, such as the level of data consistency.
Integrated Access Control and Data Provenance
Conventional access control models only consider the protection of pre-defined physical resources, such as files, directories in an operating system, a table in a database, a service, etc. They do not consider the protection of the data resources dynamically generated by web services. These data resources are computed using some locally stored physical resources and/or the data generated by other services. As they may contain sensitive or corrupted information, the dissemination or use of these data without proper control can be highly risky. Hence, it is necessary to develop suitable mechanisms to properly control the propagation of sensitive or corrupted information in service composition. Also, the write control should consider the provenance information associated with the dynamically generated data resources to ensure the secure usage of the data. In Section 5.1, we consider a role-based information flow control system that allows the cost-effective control of sensitive/corrupted data in service composition. In Section 5.2, we consider a constrained role-based access control system that achieves the provenance information aware write/usage control.
Role-based Information Flow Control
Conventional role-based access control mechanisms consider only the immediate accesses. However, in a service composition, many services, potentially from different domains, are involved in the computations. These services may read some physical resources stored in their domains to generate their output data. These output data may be disseminated, directly or indirectly, to the user or other services in the composition, or be written to some local physical resources. Consider a service chain <s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 > ( Figure 5 ). s 1 reads some physical resources, pr 1 and pr 2 , and uses them to generate its output data dr 1 . s 2 takes in dr 1 from s 1 and reads some local physical resource pr 3 to generate its output dr 2 , which is delivered to s 3 . s 3 reads some physical resource pr 4 and generates its output data dr 3 which is delivered to s 4 . s 4 takes in pr 4 and performs write operation to some physical resource pr 5 , Consider the interaction between s 3 and s 4 . On one hand, s 3 needs to ensure that s 4 has the permission to perform read operation over pr 4 (conventional consideration) and the "receive_from" operation over s 3 . As dr 3 is indirectly computed from pr 3 , pr 1 , and pr 2 , s 3 also needs to ensure that s 4 is an eligible reader of these physical resources (information flow control consideration). On the other hand, s 4 needs to ensure that it is safe to use dr 3 to update pr 5 , i.e. whether s 3 is eligible to perform the write operation on pr 5 (conventional consideration) and the "send_to" operation to s 4 In order to grant s 4 's read of dr 3 , s 4 needs to be able to activate a set of consistent roles (i.e., ones that can be activated simultaneously), r i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, such that there exists a set of consistent inter-domain role mappings that map r i , for each i, to some role that contains the permission to read pr i . To grant s 4 's "receive_from" operation of s 3 , s 4 needs to activate a set of consistent roles r i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, such that there exists a set of consistent inter-domain role-mappings that map r i , for each i, to some role that has the permission to receive data from s i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
In order to grant the write to pr 5 , for the role activated by each prior service s j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, r j , there must exist a set of consistent inter-domain role mappings that map r j to some role that contains the permission to write pr 5 . To grant the "send_to" operation of s 4 , there must exist a set of consistent inter-domain role mappings that map r j to some role that contains the permission to send information to s 4 .
We consider that the metadata associated with these dynamically generated data resources (e.g. dr 1 , dr 2 , and dr 3 ) include these above role information. For the read control ( Figure 6 ), it is necessary to record which role(s) in the data originator's domain may be required to grant the access. Suppose that roles r 1 and r 2 include the read permission for pr 1 , roles r 3 and r 4 include the read permission for pr 2 , and pr 2 and pr 3 require role r 5 and r 6 , respectively. Also, suppose that r 7 , r 8 , and r 9 include the "receive_from" permission for s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 , respectively. The metadata of dr 1 needs to encode (r 1 ∨ r 2 ) ∧ (r 3 ∨ r 4 ) ∧ r 7 . Such information will be further carried by dr 2 and dr 3 . For dr 2 , we need to encode (r 1 ∨ r 2 ) ∧ (r 3 ∨ r 4 ) ∧ r 5 ∧ r 7 ∧ r 8 , and for dr 3 , we encode (r 1 ∨ r 2 ) ∧ (r 3 ∨ r 4 ) ∧ r 5 ∧ r 6 ∧ r 7 ∧ r 8 ∧ r 9 (*). On disseminating dr 3 to s 4 , s 4 needs to prove to s 3 that there is a set of consistent cross-domain role-mappings that can map s 4 to a subset of {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 , r 6 , r 7 , r 8 , r 9 } such that * is evaluated to true. For the write control (Figure 7) , it is necessary to record the activated roles of the prior services. Suppose that s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 activate roles r A , r B , and r C , respectively. Then, the metadata of dr 1 will encode r A , dr 2 will encode r A ∧ r B , and dr 3 will encode r A ∧ r B ∧ r C . Suppose that the role that includes the write permission for pr 5 is r D and the role including the "send_to" permission for s 4 is r E . On invoking s 4 , for each role x in {r A , r B , r C }, s 4 needs to verify whether there exists a set of inter-domain role mappings that map x to r D . Moreover, on writing to pr 5 , s 4 needs to verify whether there exists a set of inter-domain role mappings that map x to r E . We use the concept of transformation factor [22] [4] to achieve fine-grained information flow control. The transformation factor of a service s, tf(s), models how s processes its input and the data read from local physical resources to produce its output. As can be seen, the transformation factor measures the deducibility of the input of a service from its output and also how the input impacts the output. Hence, it creates a special case that may greatly speed up the policy evaluation process. That is, if the likelihood of deriving the input from the output is low (when the transformation factor is NR), then the access can be directly granted. Moreover, we may also specify constraints over transformation factor to generate transformation factor aware access control decisions. For example, we may simply allow all the indirect accesses with LR (low risk) transformation factor in applications with lower security requirement.
Constrained Role-based Information Flow Control with Data Provenance
When writing a dynamically generated data resource, say dr, to a physical resource pr, it is not only necessary to ensure that the potential owners of dr have the write permission for pr, but also to consider various provenance information of dr, including summarized provenance `data, e.g. data quality, reliability, trustworthiness, etc, and detailed provenance data, e.g. user, service, domain, etc. Note that, the provenance information is not used for read control. We consider incorporating the provenance information into constraints that constitute a constrained RBAC model. Also, as discussed in Section 5.1, we may include transformation factor in these constraints. A constraint is a set of conditions defined over a subset of the following attributes: data quality, reliability, trustworthiness, user or service name, domain name, and transformation factor. Note that a provenance constraint is either defined over summarized provenance attributes (i.e. data quality, reliability, and trustworthiness) or over detailed provenance attributes (i.e. user/service name, domain name).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed an integrated model and associated techniques for data provenance and access control in SOA based net-centric systems. Data provenance and access control research can complement and enhance each other. Data provenance provides a well-defined information collection process that can support access control decision making. The rich information provided by a data provenance system can be used to enhance the access control model to achieve better control of data accesses and information flow. On the other hand, the formalism in modeling system entities in access control models, such as the definitions of roles and the role mapping techniques in role-based model, can be applied to the data provenance frameworks to facilitate better specifications of the originators and contributors in the data processing sequences. Various issues in the integrated Our work opens a new direction of research and many issues in the integrated model are yet to be addressed. Here, we outline a few future research directions. First, we plan to further analyze the provenance data and identify the classes of information that are useful in access and information flow control in SOA based systems. Based on the investigation, we will develop techniques for deriving new data quality attributes and enhance the corresponding access and information flow control model for making use of the data quality attributes. Second, we plan to investigate the performance improvement techniques for provenance information tracking in the integrated model. Various methods have been developed to improve the efficiency of data provenance. For example, selective data provenance based on data classification as discussed in [16] can be applied to our integrated model as well. We plan to develop the techniques for data classification driven by access and information flow control models and use the results to achieve selective provenance. Third, we plan to apply the model to real world scenarios and identify issues that require further investigation.
